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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Augustus Kleemeier, Jr., Harry Woodrow McGalliard, and Lucile
Marshall Elliott.
The following students have been elected to the Order of the
Coif: Hugh Lewis Lobdell, Irvin Elsworth Erb, and Joe Colin
Eagles.
Shepard's Citations and the North Carolina Law Review.
The publishers of Shepard's Citations have announced that, beginning with the June 1934 Cumulative Supplement, Shepard's North
Carolina Citations will carry citations to the Articles and Notes and
Comments in THE

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

which deal with

North Carolina cases, constitution and statutes and with the United
States constitution and statutes. At first this service will cover only
Volume XII of the REVIEW, being the issues of December 1933, and
February, April, and June 1934, and subsequent issues. Later on it
is planned to extend the citations to cover all of the previous eleven
volumes of the REVIEW. It will not include reference to comments
on North Carolina cases or statutes in other LAW REviEws. It is
earnestly hoped that at some later time the service may thus be
extended.
This new feature of Shepard's North Carolina Citations will
greatly enlarge its usefulness and that of THE NORTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW to the bench and bar.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Impairment of Contract-Mortgage
Relief During the Depression.,
In an action under the North Carolina statute authorizing courts
of equity to enjoin the consummation of sales under powers of sale
contained in deeds of trust and mortgages solely on the ground that
the highest bid at the sale does not represent the reasonable value of
the property, the trial court, after finding that the bid of $40,000 at
the trustee's sale was only about half of the reasonable value of the
land, issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the trustee and
purchaser from consummating the sale. On appeal, held, that the
statute applies to sales under deeds of trust executed prior to its enactment, and being remedial only does not impair the obligation of
contract nor deprive the parties of property without due process of
law, nor confer upon mortgagors or trustors exclusive privileges.'
'Woltz v. Deposit Co., 206 N. C. 239 (1934).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In the recent case of Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. BlaisdellV
the Supreme Court of the United States put its stamp of approval
on legislative attempts to relieve mortgagors during the present economic depression. A Minnesota statute authorized the district courts
to extend the period of redemption from mortgage foreclosure and
execution sales for a just and equitable period, not beyond May 1,
1935, and during that time to withhold the right of deficiency judgments, contingent upon the mortgagor's paying a reasonable rental
value to be applied to the interest, taxes, and mortgage indebtedness.
The court by a five to four decision sustained the statute holding
that it was not an unlawful impairment of the obligation of contract
nor a violation of the due process or equal protection clauses of the
Federal Constitution. In applying the principle of harmonizing the
constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power
the court said, "The economic interests of the state may justify the
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts."
Among the many legal problems raised by the depression, perhaps
none has attained more widespread importance than that of the defaulting mortgagor. The decisions seem to be unanimous in holding
that in the absence of statute the existence of a financial depression
and the fact that the property cannot be sold for a fair price are not
sufficient grounds for enjoining a sale under a mortgage or deed of
trust.0 Also it has been generally held that in the absence of fraud
and unfairness mere inadequacy of price will not invalidate a foreclosure sale. 4 Such sales, however, have been set aside when the
price is so grossly inadequate as to shock the court's conscience or
imply fraud. 5
The Wisconsin court has held that in the light of the present
emergency the equity courts may, independently of moratory stat278 L. ed. 251, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934) commented upon (1934) 1 U. C1.
L. R.v. 639 and (1934) 47 HAgv. L. REv. 660.
'Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335 (1932) commented upon (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV. 172; note (1932) 82 A. L. R. 976;
JONEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §2354; WILTsIr, MORTGAGV FORECLOSURES
(4th ed. 1927) §663.
'Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Ballentine, 186 Ark. 141, 52 S. W. (2d)
965 (1932) ; Baldwin v. Brown, 193 Cal. 345, 224 Pac. 462 (1924) ; Springer
v. Law, 185 Ill. 542, 57 N. E. 435 (1900); Roberson v. Mathews, 200 N. C.

241, 156 S. E. 496 (1930); note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1001; JONES, op. cit. supra
note5 3, §§2108, 2140, 2462; WmTsIm, op. cit supra note 3, §§752, 759.
Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285, 51 L. ed. 803, 27 Sup. Ct. 527 (1907);

Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 249 N. W. 844 (Mich. 1933); Hoffman v. McCracken, 168 Mo. 337, 67 S. W. 878 (1902) note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1001.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
utes, take any one, two, or all of three steps: "(1) The court may
decline to confirm the sale where the bid is substantially inadequate.
... (2) The court in ordering a sale or resale, may, in its discretion,
fix a minimum or ups'et price at which the premises must be bid in if
the sale is to be confirmed .... (3) The court may, upon application
for the confirmation of a sale, if it has not theretofore fixed an upset
price, conduct a hearing, establish the value of the property, and, as a
condition to confirmation, require that the fair value of the property
be credited upon the foreclosure judgment."
In the last year, the legislatures of twenty-five states have passed
various types of mortgage moratory statutes.7 A majority of the
courts which have considered such statutes have held them unconstitutional on the grounds that they impaired the obligation of contracts. 8 These courts in following the traditional9 and logical view
have taken the position that where the power of the legislature was
specifically limited or denied, no power could be exercised, however
great the emergency, and that the police power did not enable states
6
Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933) (in determining fair value potential or future value should be considered) commented upon (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 744; (1933) 27 ILL L. Rav. 950; (1933)
81 U. PA. L. REv. 883; (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 286; note (1933) 85 A. L. R.
1480. Some courts have approved the requirement'that fair value be credited
on deficiency decrees. Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein,
113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 Ati. 538 (1933). Others have refused to fix an upset
price on the ground that competitive bidding might be further discouraged.
United Building & Loan Ass'n. of the City of Newark v. Neuman, 113 N. J.
Eq. 224, 166 Atl. 537 (1933) ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, supra note 5.
' For a discussion of the statutes see notes: (1933) A. B. A. J. 474; (1934)
47 HARV. L. REv. 660; (1933) 42 YALa L. J. 1236.
'Aliance Trust Co., Limited v. Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285 (D. Idaho, 1933)
(proclamation of governor of Idaho suspending foreclosure of real estate mortgages held not to apply to mortgages executed before legislative act authorizing
the suspension because of unconstitutional impairment of contract) ; Adams v.
Spillyards, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (Ark. 1933) (statute in effect abolishing deficiency judgments) commented upon (1933) 20 VA. L. REv. 122; State ex rel.
Cleveringa v. Klein, 249 N. W. 118 (N. D. 1933) (unconditional statutory
extension in redemption period) noted in (1933) 86 A. L. R. 1539; Life Ins.
Co. of Va. v. Sanders, 62 S. W. (2d) 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (provision
for continuance of court until May 1, 1934, in foreclosure sales and for temporary injunction against foreclosure sales) ; cf. Milkint v. McNeeley, 169 S.
E. 790 (W. Va. 1933) (statute extending time of redemption for tax sales
held unconstitutional). Other state decisions have held such statutes valid.
Blaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Ass'n., 249 N. W. 334 (Minn. 1933);
Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Beaumont Petroleum Syndicate v. Broussard, 64 S. W. (2d) 993 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933).
Bronson v. Kinsie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 397 (U. S. 1843) ; Howard v.
Bugbee, 24 How. 461, 16 L. ed. 753 (U. S. 1860); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163
U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1896).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to impair the obligation of contracts.' 0 This course of the state decisions tending toward holding the moratory statutes invalid was
halted by the Blaisdell case which seems to establish the doctrine that
the contract clause is subject to the police power of the states, and
that laws altering contracts constitute an impairment within the
meaning of the clause only if they are unreasonable.
The North Carolina statute in sections not involved in the principal case provides that where the mortgagee, payee, or other holder
of the obligation secured becomes the purchaser at a sale not made
pursuant to an order or decree of court and thereafter sues for a
deficiency judgment, the defendant may defeat the deficiency judgment in whole or in part by showing that the property sold was
fairly worth the amount of the debt at the time and place of sale, or
that the amount bid was substantially less'than its true value." An
Arkansas statute which in effect deprived the mortgagee of his deficiency judgment was held unconstitutional.12 However, applying
the principle laid down in the Blaisdell case it seems that the deprivation of a deficiency judgment to the extent of the fair value of
the property received by the mortgagee might be sustained as a reasonable impairment of the obligation of contract within the police
power of the state.
It is submitted that the principle of permitting a reasonable impairment of the obligation of contract is sound. Interpreted this
way, the limitation of the contract clause is similar to that of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ultimate test
of the power of the state is whether its exercise is reasonable. This
is not new, but is a doctrine consistent with prior decisions.' 8
JULE MCMICHAEL.
State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, supra note 8. N. C. Laws, 1933, c. 275,
§3, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) §2593 (d).
I N. C. LAWS 1933, c. 275, §3. By another statute the North Carolina Legislature has provided that no deficiency judgments shall be had in
foreclosures of purchase money mortgages or deeds of trust executed after
the enactment of the statute. N. C. Laws, 1933, c. 36; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, Supp. 1933) §2593 (f).
11Adams v. Spillyards, supra note 8.
' Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S.25, 24 L. ed. 989 (1878) (prohibition laws of
Mass. impairing charter of Boston Beer Co. held valid) ; Stone v. Miss., 101
U. S.814, 25 L. ed. 1079 (1879) (Miss. lottery laws held valid though charter
of lottery company was impaired) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro,
232 U. S. 548, 558, 58 L. ed. 721, 726, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 368 (1914) ("For it
is settled that neither the 'contract clause' nor the 'due process' clause has the
effect of overriding the power, of the State to establish all regulations that are
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor
10

